Montana Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 2 Summer 2009

Article 3

7-2009

Captive Regulators, Captive Shippers: The Legacy of McCarty
Farms
Anthony Johnstone
University of Montana School of Law, anthony.johnstone@umontana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Anthony Johnstone, Captive Regulators, Captive Shippers: The Legacy of McCarty Farms, 70 Mont. L. Rev.
239 (2009).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol70/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Johnstone: Captive Regulators, Captive Shippers

CAPTIVE REGULATORS, CAPTIVE SHIPPERS: THE
LEGACY OF MCCARTY FARMS
Anthony Johnstone*

Montana has more than five thousand farms growing grain and one
railroad shipping it.1 In a typical year Montana produces 150 million bushels of wheat (approximately 500,000 farm trucks), ships 140 million bushels out of state (approximately 50,000 railcars or 450 110-car grain shuttle
trains), and exports 100 million bushels from terminals in the Pacific Northwest (approximately fifty 62,000 ton freighter ships). 2 The value of this
volume of grain depends on its movement to national and world markets
beyond Montana's borders. Transporting it from the high plains to these
markets requires railroad service to the extent that more than 97% of wheat
shipments out of Montana travel by rail.3 Without competitive transportation alternatives to rail, or competitive railroad alternatives to the dominant
statewide carrier, Montana's grain producers, and the grain elevators that
intermediate between the producers and the railroad, are "captive ship4
pers."
By definition, the prices offered to captive shippers by a railroad monopoly are not effectively constrained by market competition. Instead, if
captive shippers are to have any protection at all from a railroad's potential
abuse of monopoly power, laws must fill the gap left by competition's ab* Solicitor, Montana Department of Justice; Adjunct Professor, The University of Montana
School of Law. B.A., 1995, Yale University; J.D., 1999, The University of Chicago. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Montana Department of Justice. Thanks to John Cutler,
Salvatore Massa, and Terry Whiteside for their helpful comments; to Vincent Pavlish and Zachary
Strong for their editorial assistance; and to my family for their support.
1. Natl. Agric. Statistics Serv., 2007 Census of Agriculture: Montana State & County Data, tbl.
58, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2O7/Full-Report/Volume-1,-Chapter -State Level/
Montana (2009) (farms with grain sales of $1000 or more); Freight Railroads: Industry Health Has
hnproved, but Concerns About Competition and Capacity Should Be Addressed, Govt. Accountability
Off. Rpt., 07-94 at 27 (Govt. Accountability Off. 2007) [hereinafter Freight Railroads].
2. Natl. Agric. Statistics Serv., Recorded Wheat Movement by Destinationand Marketing Years:
2007, http://www.nass.usda.gov/Statistics-by-State/Montana/Publications/Press-Releases-Crfops/gm
utilize.htm (last accessed May 14, 2009); Mont. Wheat & Barley Comm., Capacity of Transportation
Modes, http://wbc.agr.mt.gov/Producers/Transportation/CapacityOtTransportationModes.pdf (last accessed May 14, 2009).
3. Natl. Agric. Statistics Serv., Grain Movement July December 2008, http://www.nass.usda.gov/
Statistics by State/Montana/Publications/Press Releases Crops/grn/gmjuldec.htm (Apr. 8, 2009). Barley ships by rail to the same extent. Id.
4. BNSF Ry. v.Surface Transp. Bd., 526 F.3d 770, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also McCarty
Farms, Inc. v.Burlington N., Inc., 91 F.R.D. 486, 486 (D. Mont. 1981) [hereinafter McCarty Farms 1]
(holding that both wheat growers and grain elevators may suffer injuries in fact sufficient to confer
standing to challenge rates under the Interstate Commerce Act).
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sence. For more than a century, those laws-laws that set the terms under
which Montana-grown grain travels to market-have been administered by
a single federal regulatory agency in Washington, D.C. This centralized
regime began in 1886 when the United States Supreme Court struck down
an Illinois law regulating rates on an interstate railroad, suggesting that
.,regulation can only appropriately exist by general rules and principles,
which demand that it should be done by the Congress of the United States
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution."' 5 The next year Congress
enacted the Interstate Commerce Act, establishing the Interstate Commerce
Commission and requiring that "[a]l] charges made for any service rendered
or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property" by railroad "shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable
'6
charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful."
The development of the Interstate Commerce Act, like that of its contemporary- the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18907-is intertwined with the
development of agricultural production in the United States., During the
early decades of the Interstate Commerce Commission, its fortunes paralleled those of the agricultural interests that supported its creation, reaching
"the peak of the Commission's power and prestige" in the decade preceding
the First World War. 9 As farmers' political power waned and other shippers' transportation options multiplied, however, the Commission became
increasingly dependent on railroad support. By mid-century the railroads
had embraced the Commission with an "attitude of ... satisfaction, approbation, and confidence." 10 In time, the Interstate Commerce Commission
showed that regulators, as well as shippers, could be captured by railroads.
The relationship among the Commission, the railroads, and the shippers took another turn 30 years ago with the deregulation of the transportation industries, as Congress reoriented the Interstate Commerce Commission to protect railroads in addition to shippers. Part I of this article describes the circumstances behind this regulatory shift and the regime it
produced. Part II explains both the development and failure of the new
regime in a case brought by a group of Montana wheat and barley farmers,
McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc. Part III describes the
termination of the Commission and the attempts of the newly created Sur5. Wabash, St. Louis & P. R.R. v. Ill.,
118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886).
6. Interstate Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 49-41, §§ 1, 11, 24 Stat. 379, 379, 383 (1887) (superseded 1976).

7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
8. See generally Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Directionfor AgriculturalLaw,
75 N.D. L. Rev. 449, 450-453 (1999).
9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the
Public Interest, 61 Yale L. J.467, 471 (1952).
10. Id. at 473.
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face Transportation Board to correct the regulatory failure of McCarty
Farms. Part IV explains the impact of the new regime on railroads and
grain shippers, and discusses procedural lessons from McCarty Farms that
may guide future reforms of the Surface Transportation Board and other
regulatory institutions.
I.

RAILROAD REVITALIZATION BY REGULATORY REFORM

Ninety years after the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act, the
financial condition of the railroad industry "was poor and seemingly getting
worse." 11 The share of inter-city freight carried by railroads shrunk from
75% to 38% fifty years later. 12 The industry's rates of return fell far below
those of other industries, and capital-starved major Class I railroads faced
more than $4 billion in deferred maintenance expenses and delayed capital
expenditures. 13 Several northeast railroads had recently emerged from
bankruptcy as the Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), 11 of the 36
Class I railroads were earning negative returns on investment, and threeincluding the Milwaukee Road running through central Montana-had entered bankruptcy. 1 4 Still, several western railroads other than the Milwaukee Road were relatively healthy compared to their eastern counterparts at
the time. 15 Meanwhile, truck and barge traffic benefited from federally
subsidized highways and waterways and from far less regulation. 16 Rail
regulation under the Interstate Commerce Commission complicated railroads' attempts to reduce prices to meet the competition and to shift ser17
vices to meet changing demand.
Congress responded in 1976 with the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R Act).' 8 The 4R Act's purpose was "to provide the
means to rehabilitate and maintain the physical facilities, improve the operations and structure, and restore the financial stability of the railway system
of the United States" through a policy that included rate deregulation in
competitive markets. 19 The 4R Act accomplished deregulation primarily by
repealing the Interstate Commerce Act's regulation of "all charges" and replacing it with "just and reasonable" rate regulations only when the Com11. Railroad Regulation: Economic and FinancialImpacts of the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Gen.
Acctg. Off. Rpt., 90-80 at 10 (Gen. Acctg. Off. May 1990) [hereinafter Railroad Regulation].
12. Id.
13. Id. at 10- 11.
14. Id. at 11.
15. See generally Adequacy QofRailroad Revenue, 362 I.C.C. 199, 208 (Surface Transp. Bd. 1979).
16. Railroad Regulation, supra n. 11, at 13.
17. Id. at 12.
18. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31
(1976) (4R Act).
19. Id. at 33.
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mission found the railroad to have "market dominance. ' 20 The 4R Act promoted financial stability in the industry by requiring the Commission to
"make an adequate and continuing effort to assist" railroads in earning revenue levels that are "adequate under honest, economical, and efficient management to cover total operating expenses, including depreciation and obsolescence, plus a fair, reasonable, and economic profit or return (or both) on
'2 1
capital employed in the business."

Four years later, Congress observed that, without additional action, the
"failure to achieve increased earnings within the railroad industry will result
in either further deterioration of the rail system or the necessity for additional Federal subsidy. '22 Based on these findings, Congress followed the
4R Act with the Staggers Act.23 The Staggers Act required the Commission
to consider revenue adequacy in regulating rates. 24 It also created a safe
harbor from a finding of market dominance, and thus rate regulation, based
25
on the ratio of a railroad's revenues to its variable costs.
II.

THE STORY OF MCCARTY FARMS

A few weeks before President Carter signed the Staggers Act into law,
a class of 10,000 Montana farmers and grain elevators sued Burlington
Northern in the McCarty Farms case. 26 The farmers alleged that the railroad charged them unreasonably high freight rates for wheat shipments
from Montana to port terminals in the Pacific Northwest over the preceding
two years, in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act's requirement that
interstate shipping rates remain "reasonable. '27 Thus began the case's 18year "crawl through the legal system.

'28

At the case's outset, the parties agreed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of
the freight rates, but the plaintiff class included both grain elevators who
paid freight rates directly and farmers who did not transact directly with the
railroad. Burlington Northern objected that the farmers lacked standing to
challenge rates they did not pay. 29 As a matter of antitrust law under the
20. Id. at 35; (f. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(1) (2000).
21. 90 Star. at 41; cf. 49 U.S.C. § 10704(a)(2) (2000).
22. Pub. L. No. 96-448, § 2, 94 Stat. 1895, 1896 (1980).

23. Id.
24. Id. at 1903; (f 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d) (2000).
25. 94 Stat. at 1900-1901; cf 49 U.S.C. § 10707(d) (2000).
26. McCarty Farms 1, 91 F.R.D. at 486.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (1980).
28. Burlington N. R.R. v. C.C., 985 F.2d 589, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1993) [hereinafter McCarty Farms
29. McCarty Farms 1, 91 F.R.D. at 487.
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Clayton Act, 30 to avoid "a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants,"
indirect purchasers like the farmers could not recover from the railroad if it
was also liable to a direct purchaser like the grain elevator. 31 However, the
district court declined to apply this "indirect purchaser" rule to a rate case
because it could allocate reparations for unreasonable rates between the di32
rect and indirect shippers already included within the plaintiff class.
With these threshold questions resolved, the district court referred the
case to the ICC to determine the reasonableness of the rates. 33 Then matters got complicated-so complicated, the Commission later conceded, that
it relied upon an appendix to recite the procedural history of the case. 34 The
shippers added a claim concerning barley rates to the wheat-rate claim
raised in the original ICC complaint, which the Commission split into a
separate case, then later consolidated with another case brought by agencies
of the State of Montana. 35 In a pattern that would repeat itself later, the
Commission set a moving target of continuously new and revised guidelines, standards, and rules while the cases were pending. In the four years
after the Commission consolidated the cases, it reopened them for comment
on one set of rate guidelines, held them in abeyance while it worked on
another set of rate standards, reopened them again for additional evidence
under the new rate standards, and then reopened them for a third time for
additional evidence under a revision of yet another set of standards. 36 Six
years after the district court originally referred the case, the Commission
37
tentatively found the wheat and barley rates unreasonable.
A.

Market Dominance

The Commission began its analysis of the McCarty Farms claims by
examining the railroad's market dominance: "an absence of effective competition from other rail carriers or modes of transportation" is a prerequisite
to finding unreasonable rates. 38 The market dominance inquiry includes
both a qualitative analysis of actual and potential competition and a quantitative analysis of rate levels measured by the revenue-to-variable cost per30. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
31. Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977).
32. McCarty Farms 1, 91 F.R.D. at 491.
33. McCarty Farms v. Burlington N. Inc., 3 I.C.C.2d 822, 846 (1987) [hereinafter McCarty Farms

II].
34. Id. at 823.
35. Id.at 846 47.
36. Id. at 847.
37. Id. at 844.
38. Id. at 825 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a) (1987) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10707(a) (2000)).
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centage. 3 9 If a railroad's rates result in a revenue-to-variable cost percentage (R/VC) of less than 180%, the railroad lacks market dominance as a
matter of law, even if the shipper otherwise shows an overall absence of
effective competition. 40 The Commission has called the market dominance
finding in general, and the 180% level in particular, "jurisdictional."'4 1 The
railroad did not contest the jurisdictional R/VC percentage, which the shippers showed to fall between 240% and 250%.42
The qualitative competition analysis included four kinds of competition: intramodal (other railroads to the same destinations), intermodal (other
means of transport to the same destinations), product (other products the
receiver can substitute), and geographic (other destinations the shipper can
substitute). 43 The Commission found no effective intramodal competition-given that Burlington Northern owned 91% of the railroad tracks
which served 98% of the grain elevators-and had minimal competition
from its then-rivals, the Union Pacific, running south from Butte and the
44
Soo Line, running through the extreme northeastern corner of the state.
The Commission found slightly more intermodal competition from trucking
companies for transport to Lewiston, Idaho, and from barge shipments
down the Snake and Columbia rivers. Even with this competition, the Rail45
road still carried 80% of the grain shipments to Pacific Northwest ports.
Geographically, the shippers showed they could not easily switch markets by diverting most of their grain past their competitors to eastern and
Gulf ports. 4 6 The shippers also successfully argued that their high-protein
grains were renowned as the "Cadillac of wheat" for which there was no
substitute. 47 Later, due to the complexity and expense of the analysis, the
Surface Transportation Board limited the consideration of these kinds of
"indirect" competition (in product and geographic markets) to the transported product, the origin, and the destination to which the rate at issue
48
applies.

39. McCarty Farms //, 3 I.C.C.2d at 825 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10709(d) (1982) (now 49 U.S.C.
§ 10707(d) (2000)).
40. 49 U.S.C. § 10707(d)(1) (2000) (previously 49 U.S.C. § 10707(d)(2) (1982)).
41. Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. Ch. & N.W. Transp. Co., 7 I.C.C.2d 330, 332 (Surface Transp. Bd.
1991).
42. McCarty Farms II, 3 I.C.C.2d at 825 n. 4.
43. Id. at 825.
44. Id. at 827.
45. Id. at 830.
46. Id. at 834.
47. Id.at 836.
48. Assn. ofAm. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 306 F.3d 1108, 1109 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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Rate Reasonableness

Under the regulatory reform acts, "[i]f the Commission determines...
that a rail carrier has market dominance over the transportation to which a
particular rate applies, the rate established by such carrier for such transportation must be reasonable. '49 The "Long-Cannon Amendment" to the Staggers Act prescribed factors the Commission must consider to protect captive shippers from subsidizing other shippers by discouraging underpriced
railroad services for shippers in competitive parts of the rail network, encouraging recovery of the maximum amount of fixed costs from those shippers under competitive pricing, and keeping a captive shipper from "paying
'50
an unreasonable share of the carrier's overall revenues.
A countervailing constraint on the reasonableness determination is
Congress's policy, expressed repeatedly in statute, "that rail carriers shall
earn adequate revenues." 5 1 In testing the reasonableness of the rail freight
rates charged in McCarty Farms,the Commission had before it a sample of
282 out of more than 3,000 freight "movements. '52 While the Commission
could not compute the relief owed to shippers based on that record, it did
attempt to develop a process for determining the reasonableness of individual rate levels. 53 The Commission considered two options for the rate review: so-called "Coal Guidelines" originally established for large shipments
from single origins (such as coal from a mine) and "Non-Coal Guidelines"
for smaller shipments from multiple origins (such as grain from elevators
54
dispersed over a farming region).
1.

"Coal Guidelines": ConstrainedMarket Pricing

Constrained market pricing was the Commission's attempt to "apply[
competitive pricing principles to a regulatory framework. ' 55 The overall
objective of constrained market pricing is for a captive shipper to pay only
what is "necessary for the carrier(s) involved to earn adequate revenues,"
and for the shipper involved to receive "efficient service. ' 56 In plainer
49. 49 U.S.C. § 10701a(b)(1) (1987) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(1) (2000)).
50. Id. at § 10707a(e)(2)(C) (1987) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(2) (2000)).
51. Id. at § 10701a(b)(3) (1987) (now 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)) (2000); see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 10704(a)(2) (2000) ("The Commission shall maintain and revise as necessary standards and procedures for establishing revenue levels for rail carriers providing transportation subject to its jurisdiction
under that subchapter that are adequate, under honest, economical, and efficient management, to cover
total operating expenses, including depreciation and obsolescence, plus a reasonable and economic
profit or return (or both) on capital employed in the business.").
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

McCarty Farms H, 3 I.C.C.2d at 839.
Id.
Id. at 839-840.
Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d 520, 523 (Surface Transp. Bd. 1985).
Id.
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terms, the rate floor is the minimum price that a railroad needs to stay in
business, while the rate ceiling is the maximum price that a shipper needs to
pay to cover the costs of the railroad's service. The Commission also suggested that the revenue adequacy floor might also serve as the ceiling, with
the railroads needing to "demonstrate with particularity" why captive shippers should bear the burden of paying higher rates to provide railroads with
adequate overall revenues. 57 Two concepts, "differential pricing" and "the
contestability of markets" provided, in the Commission's words, "the analytical basis for determining those costs for which a shipper may properly
be charged and the extent to which the shipper should bear the costs."'58
a.

Ramsey Pricing and Differential Prices

The economics of railroads pose a dilemma in determining reasonable
rates for captive shippers. Railroads enjoy significant economies of scale,
scope, and density. 59 Economies of scale occur when a firm's average cost
of service declines as its facilities expand, such as a railroad's ability to run
shuttle trains of 110 cars at a lower per-car cost than a single carload, or a
trans-continental railroad's ability to move freight long distances without
the cost of multiple interchanges between railroads. Economies of scope
occur when a single firm can offer multiple services at a lower cost than
multiple firms could, such as a railroad's ability to transport grain and coal
in hoppers, chemicals in tankers, and other freight in container cars without
building separate rails for each load. Economies of density occur when a
firm's average cost-of-service declines as its facility's use increases, such as
a railroad's ability to coordinate several trains on the same tracks. 60 These
economies have limits and corresponding diseconomies-for example, unwieldy management at too-large scales of production, lack of expertise over
too-broad scopes of services, and congestion costs at too-busy densities of
traffic-but the Commission concluded "there are at least some production
'6
economies in the rail industry." '
In economic terms, the consequence of these efficiencies is that the
marginal cost of rail service (running one more carload) is less than the
average cost (running the carload plus the per-carload share for the car,
locomotive, and tracks). 62 A railroad can offer an additional shipper service at the relatively low marginal cost of moving the carload from its origin to a destination, but it will offer that additional service only if it can
57. Id. at 536 n. 36.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 525.
Id. at 526.
Id. at 553.
Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d at 531.
Id. at 526.
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cover the associated fixed costs with other revenue. For traditional utilities
exhibiting similar economic characteristics, this is not a problem-the
power company with an exclusive franchise on delivering electricity to
homes without substitute power sources can achieve revenue adequacy by
charging all of its customers the average costs of the energy and transmission lines.
A marginal cost below average cost presents a rate-setting problem.
Unlike traditional utilities, railroads can face competition from substitute
transportation modes that can price below the railroad's average cost. The
task of determining reasonable rates while ensuring revenue adequacy demands some method of differential pricing "because the railroad's rates for
its non-captive service are determined by market forces, while the non-captive service utilizes much of the same facilities. '63 Consider, for example, a
railroad that runs from Montana to Idaho and Washington, then along the
Columbia River to Portland, Oregon. If the railroad charges only its marginal costs to every shipper, it cannot cover its total costs, cannot survive as a
viable business, and thus cannot serve any shipper. But if the railroad
charges its average costs to every shipper, it will lose customers at the western end of the line, for whom it is cheaper to truck their grain to the barges
(no matter whether it is even cheaper to pay the marginal cost of rail service
plus some small share of fixed costs). That loss of business in Washington
affects not only the railroad's revenue, but also the truck-barge shipper that
loses access to marginally more efficient rail service and the Montana shipper that now pays higher rates to cover the same fixed costs spread among
fewer shippers.
Ramsey pricing offers a partial solution to this problem. Originally a
theory developed to determine optimal tax rates, Ramsey pricing charges a
higher price to buyers with less elastic demand and a lower price to buyers
with more elastic demand. 64 Demand elasticity depends upon the buyer's
ability to substitute a different service in response to a price increase. Thus
a captive shipper with few service alternatives has relatively inelastic demand, and as a result, will pay more under Ramsey pricing than a shipper
with many service alternatives who can, for example, shift to truck-barge
shipping when confronted with a price increase for rail service. According
to the Commission, "[a]pplied to the railroad industry, Ramsey pricing
would permit an efficient carrier to cover all of its costs (including the cost
'65
of capital) and thus become revenue adequate.
Unfortunately, the demand elasticity calculations required for true
Ramsey pricing are practically impossible to apply to every shipment by a
63. Consol. Rail Corp. v. U.S., 812 F.2d 1444, 1453 (3d Cir. 1987).
64. Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C. 2d at 526-527.
65. Id. at 527.
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given railroad. Thus the Commission embraced the simpler form of differential pricing already reflected in its jurisdictional limits: the only prices
that need to be regulated-and the only prices that can be regulated under
the "market dominance" test-are those of captive shippers, who by definition have low demand-elasticity and pay higher prices. High demand-elasticity shippers, who by definition have other shipping options, enjoy lower
prices that are closer to the marginal cost. Ideally, "market forces will
'66
largely determine the share of the costs to be borne by each shipper.
Market forces, therefore, already directly determine the share of costs borne
by non-captive shippers paying unregulated rates. The share of costs borne
by captive shippers, however, is vulnerable to the railroads' abuse of its
monopolistic power in the absence of effective regulation.
b.

Contestable Markets and Stand-Alone Costs

The Commission derived the upper limit of reasonable rates from the
theory of "contestable markets," which states that a monopolist will behave
efficiently and competitively if a new entrant threatens to take some or all
of its markets. 67 Because the entry of a legitimate, new entrant to compete
with a dominant railroad like Burlington Northern is nearly impossible, the
Commission developed a method to determine "a simulated competitive
price."'68 The method is the "stand-alone cost" (SAC) test, which posits the
rate a hypothetical competitor would charge to serve the captive shipper's
route. That model establishes a rate that "represents the theoretical maximum rate that a railroad could levy on shippers without substantial diver'6 9
sion of traffic to a hypothetical competing service.
Of course, even a hypothetical, new railroad company could not afford
to challenge a dominant company if it had to build a railroad immediately to
catch up with one built over more than a century. "Existing railroads were
built on a piecemeal basis and were not saddled with a need to marshal, in a
short period of time, the resources required to construct a rail system the
size of [a competing transcontinental railroad]. '70 The Commission accounted for the hypothetical entrant's disadvantage by excluding these costs
of entry and exit from the SAC test, making "market dominant rail traffic
contestable in theory" and "eliminating the potential for monopoly prof66. Id. at 534.
67. Id. at 528.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. McCarty Farms, Inc. v.Burlington N., Inc.,
1997 WL 472908 at * 4 (Surface Transp. Bd. 1997)
(citing example of building the seven mile Flathead Tunnel between Whitefish and Libby) [hereinafter
McCarty Farms VI].
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its. ''7 1 The shipper's hypothetical railroad could exploit all available economies of scale, scope, and density for the most efficient route between its
origin and destination, and include groups of other existing shippers to
share fixed costs. 72 Beyond requiring shippers to test rate reasonableness
by building their own stand-alone railroads, the Commission declined "to
'73
prescribe a hard and fast formula for developing and applying SAC.
SAC testing was not the only constraint the Commission imposed on
dominant railroad pricing. Instead, it recommended an eclectic approach to
the rate reasonableness determination. "[T]he various constraints contained
in [Constrained Market Pricing] may be used individually or in combination
to analyze whether the rate at issue is unreasonably high."'7 4 Each constraint provides an approach to determining "the extent of unattributable
costs to be covered through differential pricing and the portion that can be
charged to the shipper involved. '75 First, the Revenue Adequacy Constraint makes a ceiling out of the floor of business sustainability and, in
particular, requires "that a railroad not use differential pricing to consist'76
ently earn, over time, a return on investment above the cost of capital.
The Management Efficiency Constraint then incorporates the Long-Cannon
Amendment factors, a test for whether the rate at issue is unreasonably high
because the railroad has shifted the cost of inefficiencies to captive shippers.7 7 Finally, the Phasing Constraint limits the pace of rate increases to
avoid "significant economic dislocations. '7 8 Still, given the lack of guidelines for applying these other constraints, the Stand-Alone Cost Constraint
'79
has become the approach "routinely used in rate cases.
In adopting a Constrained Market Pricing approach to rate reasonableness determinations, several Commissioners expressed concerns about a
process that amounted to testing a shipper's ability to build a hypothetical
railroad better than the real railroad its opponents actually operated. The
Chairman and others were "both concerned and hopeful that the Commission will afford captive coal shippers adequate access to whatever relevant
information they need."80 Thus, "[the real challenge for the Commission
71. Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d at 529.
72. Id. at 543 544.
73. Id. at 546.
74. Id. at 548.
75. Id. at 547.
76. Id. at 536.
77. Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d at 541.
78. Id. at 546.
79. Railroad Regulation: Current Issues Associated with the Rate Relief Process, Gen. Acctg. Off.
Rpt., 99-46 at 29 (Gen Acctg. Off. Feb. 1999) [hereinafter Issues Associated with the Rate Relie Process].
80. Coal Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d at 549 (Taylor, Chairman, commenting); see also id.
(Simmons, Commr., commenting) ("captive coal shippers must be granted the reasonable discovery of
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will be to translate these new guidelines into fair and efficient outcomes on
the individual cases that will be reviewed."8' 1
These same concerns motivated an appeal by coal shippers of the Coal
Guidelines, in which the Third Circuit rejected various challenges under the
Administrative Procedure Act to the guidelines themselves, but declined to
consider how the guidelines might be applied in particular cases.8 2 Judge
Becker, who dissented on the grounds that the Commission's Revenue Adequacy Constraint was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law, also agreed
with the shippers about the possibility "that rate challenges will be frustrated by the complexity of the Commission's inhospitable rules and procedures.18 3 Although Judge Becker found the Stand-Alone Cost Constraint
tolerable as a "well reasoned form of regulatory experimentation," he worried that "the protesting shipper is required to 'assume a railroad'-no
mean task," and a task that smaller shippers may be unable to meet.8 4 "The
Interstate Commerce Act was not passed as a full employment bill for econ'8 5
omists; it provides a procedure to shippers for challenging railroad rates."
The court gave the Commission the benefit of the doubt on the issue of
whether that procedure, and the discovery rules on which it depends, would
operate to fulfill the Act's original goals. "Time will tell," Judge Becker
8' 6
concluded in dissent, "whether our confidence has been justified.
2.

Alternative Methods of Reviewing Rates

Shortly after the Third Circuit upheld the Coal Guidelines, the Commission took note of the cost concerns surrounding the "assume a railroad"
Stand-Alone Cost approach under Constraint Market Pricing (CMP). "The
cost of developing the requisite evidence to present a case under the Coal
Guidelines procedures could prove to be prohibitive relative to the potential
'8 7
relief a complainant might realize by prevailing on the merits of the case."
A Stand-Alone Cost analysis by shippers with "diverse origins and relatively low volume shipments," like the Montana shippers, would "be extremely complex and would entail substantial expenditures, in terms of time
and money, relative to the possible savings to be obtained through rate rerailroad pricing and cost information necessary to make a case"); id. at 550 (Lamboley, Commr., commenting) ("[olur implementation [of the guidelines] will be the litmus test" of whether the promise of
regulatory reform becomes "a realin"') (emphasis in original).

81. Id. at 551 (Strenio, Commr., concumng).
82. Consol. Rail Corp., 812 F.2d at 1457.

83. Id. at 1457-1458 (Becker, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 1462.
85. Id. at 1463.
86. Id. at 1465.
87. McCarty Farms II, 3 I.C.C.2d at 840.
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lief."88 For example, McCarty Farms itself was one of the larger grain producers in the shipper class, and its annual shipment of 3,000 tons amounted
to less than one-third the tonnage in one trainload of coal.8 9 Thus the Commission decided that McCarty Farms would be the first rate proceeding in
which it would apply a proposed alternative to CMP to determine maximum
90
rate reasonableness.
The alternative method, the unimaginatively named Non-Coal Guidelines, relied on the relatively simpler R/VC comparison used in the statutory
market dominance determination. 91 Previously, the Commission declined
to rely exclusively on "an arbitrary cost ratio" for rate reasonableness determinations. 92 Simply comparing R/VC ratios between shippers (such as the
Washington and Montana grain shippers in the example above) ignores the
efficiency of differential prices under Ramsey pricing theory, and could result in the captive shipper eventually paying even higher rates if the railroad
lost other shippers as it tried to recoup a greater share of fixed costs from
more competitive parts of its network. 93 To account for differential pricing,
the Commission selected a benchmark comparison sample "with similar
transportation and demand characteristics to the issue traffic," which might
serve as a control group paying reasonable rates at similar levels of demand
inelasticity. 94 The alternative method also relied upon only a benchmark
sample of freight movements, a less complex and less costly analysis than
95
the SAC method's reliance on all movements over the route at issue.
For its comparison of benchmark wheat and barley rates in McCarty
Farms, the Commission sampled presumably captive shipments of wheat
and barley (those with the "jurisdictional" R/VC ratio of greater than 180%)
moving more than 500 miles from major grain-producing areas of the
96
United States, excluding Burlington Northern shipments from Montana.
In an attempt to control for demand characteristics and efficiency-driven
cost differences, the Commission segregated the sample into single-car,
multiple-car (26-car segments), and trainload (52-car segments) shipments. 97 Based on the average R/VC ratios within the sample group, the
Commission tentatively determined that Montana wheat and barley shipping rates are unreasonable if they produced ratios above 2.14 for single
88. Id. at 840-841.
89. McCarty Farms v. Burlington N. Inc., 4 I.C.C.2d 262, 285 n. 12 (Surface Transp. Bd. 1988)
[hereinafter McCarty Farms III].
90. McCarty Farms H, 3 I.C.C.2d at 841.
91. Id. at 842.
92. Id. at 842 n. 29.
93. For a discussion of Ramsey pricing and differential prices, see supra Part 1.B.l.a.
94. McCarty Farms II, 3 I.C.C.2d at 842.
95. Id. at 843.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 844.
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cars, 2.33 for multiple cars, and 2.24 for trainloads. In an unpublished decision the Commission applied those ratios to the McCarty Farms shipments,
calculating the overcharge based on the extent to which the average rates
paid by the complainant shippers produced ratios that exceeded the average
ratios produced by each benchmark sample group's rates. 98 Finding unreasonable rates only for trainload shipments from 1981 through 1986, the
Commission awarded damages of more than $16 million, including interest. 99 The shippers sought review of the decision in the District of Montana, but that court held that it lacked jurisdiction. 10 0
Both sides petitioned the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the
ICC decision. That court rejected the shippers' challenges to the Commission's methods, while agreeing with the railroad on its single challenge: the
Commission's use of the R/VC ratio comparison in place of CMP was unreasonable and therefore invalid. 10 1 The court cited several faults in the
new method. First, setting a ceiling based on the benchmark sample's average R/VC ratio would drive down the benchmark ratio each time a shipper
subjected to an above-average ratio brought a challenge under the same
method. 10 2 In other words, every other shipper in the sample who paid
rates producing an R/VC above the 2.24 ratio for trainloads could bring a
challenge based on the new, lower average ratio that resulted from the rate
reduction won by McCarty Farms (2.20, for example) and so forth, until the
successive challenges reached the rate ceiling down at the jurisdictional
floor of 180%. Even if such a sequence was unlikely, the court found a
theory that allowed such results to lack "any glimmer of supporting princi10 3
ple or intellectual coherence."
Second, the court found the Commission's analysis flawed because it
assumed sample rates for similarly sized grain movements (single car, multiple car, and trainload) were a useful proxy for different demand elasticities
to satisfy Ramsey pricing principles. 10 4 Rather than explaining why the
sample movements could not reveal something about demand elasticity,
however, the court simply deferred to the railroads' pricing judgments because they had "the greatest interest in making" a correct judgment "that the
05
issue traffic either costs more to transport or has a less elastic demand."'
The Commission's method, according to the court, puts it "in the position

98. McCarty Farms V, 985 F.2d at 601.
99. Id. at 591-592; see also McCarty Farms, Inc. v.Burlington N. Inc., 787 F. Supp. 937, 939 (D.
Mont. 1992) [hereinafter McCarty Farms IV].
100. McCarty Farms IV, 787 F. Supp. at 947.
101. McCarty Farms V, 985 F.2d at 591.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 597.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of simply correcting (or purporting to correct) railroad management decisions as to what prices will most benefit the railroad."10 6 This explanation
falls short, however, because the premise of the Commission's jurisdiction
is to "correct railroad management decisions"-and to make the rates reasonable-if those decisions abuse their monopoly power over captive shippers. 10 7 Still, it is difficult to discern from the Commission's reasoning
why there should have been a significant correlation between the volume of
a particular shipment (correlated with grain production at an origin) and the
demand inelasticity of the shipper (correlated with carrier competition at an
origin). One possibility may be that high-volume captive shippers are more
likely to be demand-inelastic "price takers" because there are fewer substitutes for shipping large volumes by the trainload than there are for shipping
smaller volumes by the carload. Ultimately, as the shippers' economist
conceded, the R/VC comparison method primarily measures "exploitation"
or discrimination among similarly situated grain shipments, rather than demand elasticity among similarly situated grain shippers.108
Third, the court criticized the absence of any consideration of revenue
adequacy in the R/VC comparisons.' 0 9 In particular, the court noted that
Burlington Northern's revenues were inadequate for each of the six years
for which refunds were ordered, so "it is not entirely clear why the rates
charged constituted an abuse of market power."1 10 Again, however, the
court made a leap of logic from criticizing the Commission's method to
assigning error in its result. As the Commission explained in Coal Guidelines, "a rate may be unreasonable even if the carrier is far short of revenue
adequacy" because captive shippers should "not be required to shoulder an
unreasonable share of carriers' revenue need shortfalls." '1 A finding of
unreasonable rates only impinges on the revenue adequacy interest "[i]f a
carrier's revenue inadequacy were severe, or if rate relief would have a
severe effect on the attainment of revenue adequacy in the future."' 12
Finally, the court questioned the need for alternatives to the SAC
method under CMP. Taking the McCarty Farms class as a whole, it found
comparable coal cases that applied the SAC method for similarly sized
13
shipment volumes and similarly large numbers of origination points.'
The court concluded that "the Commission has by no means shown that the
number of origin-destination pairs or the density of the traffic raise the in106. Id.
107. See 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(1) (2000).
108. McCarty Farms V, 985 F.2d at 598.

109. Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.at 597 598.
Coal Rate Guidelines, Nationwide, 1 I.C.C.2d at 520.
McCarty Farms H, 3 I.C.C.2d at 845 (Andre, Commr., commenting).
McCarty Farms V, 985 F.2d at 598.
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formation costs so drastically as to justify scuttling CMP.' 1 14 Moreover,
according to the court, the availability of aggregating claims by a state entity such as the Montana Department of Agriculture (a party to McCarty
Farms) and cost-shifting made the small shippers' concerns "seem[ ] quite
weak." 115
C.

The End of the I.C.C. and McCarty Farms

On remand, the Commission sought direction from the parties about
116
whether it should proceed with a CMP analysis of the challenged rates.
After the parties elected the SAC approach to CMP, but before the Commission could apply it, Congress passed the I.C.C. Termination Act to
abolish the Commission and transfer pending rail-rate cases to the newly
117
established Surface Transportation Board (Board).
Under the SAC approach, the shippers presented the Board with a hypothetical "Farmers Railroad" that ran along Burlington Northern's route
from Chicago to Seattle.'18' The parties fought over the smallest details,
such as how many acres would require seeding and whether a hypothetical
railroad tie for the Farmers Railroad should cost $37.80 or $56.14.119 Ap-

plying the SAC test originally developed in the Coal Guidelines, the Board
concluded that the hypothetical Farmers Railroad "would not have generated sufficient revenues over the twenty-year analysis period [1979-1988]
to cover all the costs that would have been incurred during that same pe12 1
riod."' 120 This time, the shippers lost.
On petition for review, and after an unpublished modification of the
Board's order, the District of Columbia Circuit did not conduct an in-depth
theoretical critique as it had in the prior appeal. Instead, it briefly held "the
STB has rationally set forth the grounds on which it acted, and its findings
are based on substantial evidence."' 122 The court also rejected the shippers'
attempt to carve its single-car rate claims out of that court and into the U.S.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 599.
116. McCarty Farms, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 158 F.3d 1294, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter
McCarty Farms VIl].
117. Id.; see also I.C.C. Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).
118. McCarty Farms V, 1997 WL 472908 at *4.
119. Id. at *26, *31.
120. Id. at *43.
121. See Salvatore Massa, Injecting Competition in the Railroad Industn' Through Access, 27

Transp. L.J. 1, 22 (2000) ("The woeful state of shipper redress ... is perhaps best illustrated by the
litigation in McCarty Farms v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.....
Prior to this final STB decision,
the McCarty Farms case was used as a model of an effective example of market dominance and unreasonable rates."), citing Wesley A. Wilson, Legislated Market Dominance in Railroads, in Research in
TransportationEconomics 49, 58-62 (B. Starr McMullen, ed., JAI Press 1994).
122. McCarty Farms VI, 158 F.3d at 1301.
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District Court of Montana.123 After McCarty Farms VII, the shippers did
not press further their remaining pre-1981 rate claims originally filed in the
U.S. District Court of Montana. The dispute's 18-year "crawl through the
124
legal system" had ended.
III.

THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MCCARTY FARMS

Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act (Termination Act) in 1995.125 Just before its termination, the Commission concluded that it could not find "a satisfactory means of simplifying
the CMP analysis in a way that would adhere to the theory, and approximate the results, of CMP. ' 126 Still, Congress asked the newly constituted
Surface Transportation Board to "establish a simplified and expedited
method for determining the reasonableness of challenged rail rates in those
cases in which a full stand-alone cost presentation is too costly, given the
value of the case." The Board worked on such procedures since seeking
proposals for the Non-Coal Guidelines in 1986.127 After a decade of study,
it concluded that "because precision must be sacrificed for simplicity, any
simplified procedures will necessarily be very rough and imprecise," and
"must be used as sparingly as possible, reserved for only those cases where
28
CMP is not a realistic option."'
A.

Three Benchmarks

The Board's first attempt to simplify rate reasonableness methods built
upon the failed application of the R/VC ratio in McCarty Farms to develop
a "Three Benchmark" test. The original R/VC ratio comparison was refined into a measure, called R/VC[COMP], which added an important
screen to the sample group: the comparison shipments must not be "readily
susceptible to transportation by another available mode, at least at the distances involved in the complaint." 129 Once the sample group is limited to
rail-dependent traffic, and assuming that due to the consolidation of transcontinental railroads the shipper "usually does not have a choice between
two rail carriers for the entire move," the refined test can "presume that
properly selected comparison traffic will have a similar degree of demand
123. Id. at 1299.
124. Id. at 1296.

125. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(d)(3) (2000).
126. Rate Guidelines Non Coal Proceedings, I S.T.B. 1004, 1012 (Surface Transp. Bd. 1996)

[hereinafter Non-Coal Proceedings].
127. Id. at 1010.
128. Id. at 1021.
129. Id. at 1035 n. 90.
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elasticity." 130 As the Board pointed out, railroads too must rely on indirect
means of measuring demand elasticity in setting demand-based differential
pricing, and an "imperfect approach is far preferable to abandoning any
effort to take demand-based differential pricing into account in a simplified
analysis." 13 1 A second criticism of RIVC[COMP] was the "ratcheting" effect of successive applications of an average rate ceiling; the Board sought
to mitigate that effect by excluding previously prescribed average rates
132
from the sample group.
Another criticism of R/VC[COMP] in McCarty Farms was its failure
to take into account the revenue adequacy mandate.1 33 The Board incorporated revenue adequacy into its second benchmark, the Revenue Shortfall
Adequacy Method (RSAM). It measures the "the uniform markup above
variable cost that would be needed from every shipper of potentially captive
traffic (the [R/VC] > 180 traffic group) in order for the carrier to recover all
of its ... fixed costs," and therefore attain revenue adequacy. 1 34 In a rough
approximation of Ramsey pricing principles, RSAM theoretically groups all
potentially demand-inelastic shippers into a single "potentially captive"
group sharing the fixed costs unrecovered from the other potentially demand-elastic shippers-those with R/VC ratios under 180%. The railroad's
annual revenue shortfall represents the unrecovered costs. In theory, the
RSAM benchmark is a revenue adequacy ceiling measured in R/VC terms
that performs a function similar to the Revenue Adequacy Constraint of
CMP.
The third benchmark, R/VC[>180], measures the average markup
charged by the railroad to potentially captive traffic, or, in R/VC terms, the
average R/VC ratio for all traffic producing R/VC ratios over the "potentially captive" level of 180%. 135 Whereas R/VC[COMP] attempts to measure comparable captive shipper rates across railroads to place the shipper
in context among other shippers, R/VC[>180] attempts to measure the railroad's reliance on captive shipper rates to place the shipper in context
within the railroad's traffic. This benchmark considers the relative fairness
of the railroad's rate structure, "to ensure that the complaining shipper's
traffic is not bearing a disproportionate share of the carrier's revenue requirements vis-A-vis other relatively demand-inelastic traffic without good
1
cause."' 36
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1034.

132. Non-Coal Proceedings, I S.T.B. at 1037.
133. McCarty Farms V, 985 F.2d at 598.
134. Non-Coal Proceedings, I S.T.B. at 1027.

135. Id. at 1038.
136. Id.
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The Board expected that the Three Benchmark method would consider
the relevant statutory factors of reasonableness and revenue adequacy, with
each benchmark serving as a check on the other two, while the Board would
remain open in a rate case to any other "particularized evidence" bearing
upon the proper application of the benchmarks. 137 The Board emphasized
its simplified method was motivated by a "modest objective-to make at
least a rough call as to rate reasonableness in those cases where a more
138
precise determination is not possible."
Despite the Board's modest expectations, the Three Benchmarks gathered dust. Railroads challenged the standards as "vague and unilluminating," but the D.C. Circuit found the challenge "unfit for review" at least
until "the Board applies the guidelines in a concrete case."' 139 A decade
after their adoption, no shipper had pursued a case to decision under the
Three Benchmarks. 140 Based upon comments the Board received, the shippers had finally found common ground with the railroads: they perceived
"the existing guidelines as too vague, and as requiring prolonged litigation
over whether a shipper even qualifies to use them."' 14' The Board returned
to the drawing board in the Simplified Standards proceeding. There, the
Board recalibrated some of the Three Benchmark formulas and implemented two new initiatives: a Simplified Stand-Alone Cost method and
142
streamlined procedures for small shipper rate cases.
B.

Simplified Stand-Alone Cost

The Board observed that "CMP, with its SAC constraint, is the most
accurate procedure available for determining the reasonableness of rail rates
where there is an absence of effective competition."'' 43 Yet the last attempt
to simplify the SAC method was the railroad's model that produced "reasonable rates" at R/VC ratios of 5,000%, meaning a railroad could charge
shippers fifty times its variable costs. 144 In the new proceedings, the railroads again preferred Simplified-SAC to the Three Benchmark method,
while the shippers asked the Board to abandon or delay implementation of
Simplified-SAC.1 4 5 The Board concluded that both approaches "should be
' 46
made available to shippers."'
137. Id. at 1041.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Assn. of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 146 F.3d 942, 945, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Simplified Stands. for Rail Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2493509 at *2 (Surface Transp. Bd. 2007).
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *10.
Non-Coal Proceedings, I S.T.B. at 1012.
Simplified Stands. Jbr Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2493509 at :3.
Id.
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The key to simplifying SAC was to replace the exhaustive "assume-arailroad" requirement with a less-demanding assumption that "all existing
infrastructure along the predominant route used to haul the complaint traffic
is needed to serve the traffic moving over that route." 147 In other words,
Simplified-SAC takes the railroad as it is, assumes that the existing configuration is efficient, and focuses exclusively on the railroad's rate structure
to determine "whether the captive shipper is being forced to cross-subsidize
other parts of the railroad's rail network." 148 Underlying this efficiency
assumption is the Board's belief that "[r]ailroads no longer are burdened by
substantial excess capacity," and instead their facilities are strained by increasing demand.' 4 9 In any event, whether that belief is true for the purposes of a Simplified-SAC case matters less than whether it is expedient;
.,even if the management of some railroads is not as efficient as possible,
the burden of uncovering and quantifying existing inefficiencies is so substantial as to be impracticable in all but the largest rail rate disputes."1 50
C. Simplified Proceduresand Eligibility Criteria
Before a shipper could know whether it qualified for relief, the Commission's and the Board's former rules required a complainant to pay prohibitive filing fees and litigation expenses.' 51 At the time of Simplified
Standards in 2007, the filing fee for a SAC case was $178,200,152 and a
shipper's litigation costs could amount to $5 million in legal and consulting
fees to build and advocate for a theoretical stand-alone railroad.1 53 Even
under the new standards, the Board estimated that a Simplified SAC case
would cost $1 million 54 on top of the filing fee of $10,600.155 The ThreeBenchmark filing fee has remained a more accessible $150,156 and the
Board has estimated the litigation cost at $250,000.157 Still unsatisfied with
the cost of filing a case with the Board, Congress limited all rate-complaint
filing fees to $350.158
147. Id. at *11.

148. Id.
149. Id.

150. Id.
151. For a legal critique of the filing fees, see generally P. Pfohl, Who Should Pay fJr Agency
Adjudication? A Study of $200,000 Filing Fees at the Surface TransportationBoard, 26 Trans. L.J. 57
(1997).
152. Simplified Stands. fJr Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2493509 at *57.
153. Id. at *23.

154. Id.
155. Id. at *57.

156. Id.
157. Id. at *24.
158. Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2764, 110th Cong. (Jan. 4, 2007); cf. 49 C.F.R.
§ 1002.2(f)(56) (2008).
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Given the imprecision of the simplified standards, and without the financial barriers of a full SAC case and filing fees to limit shipper challenges, the railroads suggested that the simplified procedures be subject to
relief limits. 159 The Board agreed and developed eligibility levels based on
the cost to litigate the next most costly case; thus a shipper seeking relief of
less than the $1 million cost of a Simplified-SAC case would be eligible for
a Three Benchmark case, and a shipper seeking relief of less than the $5
million cost of a full SAC case would be eligible for a Simplified-SAC
case. 160 Recoveries under either simplified standard would be limited to
five years. 16 1 Shippers objected to the limits. A claim of $2 million, for
example, could only succeed in a Simplified-SAC case, which, at the cost
of $1 million to litigate, would reduce the expected recovery by half. The
Board responded that the "risk factor" associated with the expected recovery should be limited to four or five times the cost of litigation. Beyond
this, the Board expressed a concern that shippers might disaggregate large
claims into several smaller claims to exploit the perceived cost advantages
162
of bringing a case under the simplified standards.
Reviewing the reforms under the simplified standards, the Board attempted to quantify how wide it opened the door to captive shippers previously shut out by the expense of a full SAC case. Based on a rate sample
for captive shippers, and assuming a maximum recovery over five years of
all charges over the jurisdictional floor R/VC ratio of 180%, the Board concluded that shippers representing 73% of potentially captive traffic had
been denied the opportunity to seek relief under the prohibitive costs of a
full SAC case, and 45% of that traffic also would have found the Simplified-SAC too costly. 163 Farm-product shippers faced an even higher hurdle: a full SAC case was impracticable for 89% of the traffic, and the untested Three Benchmark method was the only practical source of relief for
60% of the traffic. 164 Between 1990 and 1998, only 2 out of 41 shipper
complaints under consideration resulted in an award of damages for the
165
shipper, and both were coal shippers; 18 more resulted in settlements.
Between 2001 and 2006, only ten cases have been filed, nine of them by
166
coal shippers.
After these dismal reflections on the past, the Board has expressed
cautious optimism that the simplified standards are "an important step for159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Simplified Stands. jor Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2493509 at "21.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *21.
Id.
Id. at *27.
Id.
Issues Associated with the Rate ReliejProcess, supra n. 79, at 6-7.
Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 41 (2007).
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ward in creating a workable structure for resolving rate disputes of all
sizes." 167 Commissioner Buttrey expressed a more particular aspiration.
"In 1887, the genesis of U.S. railroad regulation arose from concerns about
rates for grain shippers." 168 Now, with the Board's renewed attempt to fulfill its mandate for the nine out of ten farm shipments that were shut out for
the past three decades, he hoped that the reforms could give grain shippers
.,a more reasonable opportunity to prevail in a small rate case if their rates
are unusually high." 169 Meanwhile, several railroads have petitioned for
170
review of the new standards.

IV.

THE LEGACY OF MCCARTY FARMS

Congress's legislative response to the railroad crisis of the late 1970s,
followed by three decades of oversight by the Commission and the Board,
has succeeded in giving the railroad industry its comeback. Since 1980, the
number of freight ton-miles carried by railroads has nearly doubled, and the
railroads' share of inter-city freight has rebounded from a low of 26% in
1985 to 38% in 2005.171 Over this period, railroads have consolidated their
operations and facilities, as the number of Class I railroads has declined
from 40 to 7.172 In the past two decades, railroads have reduced their miles
17 3
of track owned by nearly 27%.
In the last decade, the railroad industry's financial performance measured by earnings-per-share growth has met or exceeded the growth of the
S&P 500 Index. 174 Railroads' return on investment has stabilized over the
175
past decade, indicating "an increasingly strong freight railroad industry."
The Board recently concluded that "even after factoring out rising fuel
costs, railroad rates have risen in the past three years after falling for decades."1 76 Burlington Northern's successor, Burlington Northern Santa Fe
(BNSF), more than doubled its dividend between 1997 and 2007, and its
167. Simplified Stands. fr Rail Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2493509 at *28.
168. Id. at *31.
169. Id.
170. Simplified Stands. fr Rail Rate Cases, 2007 WL 2816248.
171. Laurits R. Christensen Assocs., Inc., A Study of Competition in the U.S. FreightRailroad Industry and Analysis of Proposals that Might Enhance Competition ES-7, tbl. ES-I, http://www.stb.dot.gov/
stb/elibrary/CompetitionStudy.htnl; select "Executive Summary" (Nov. 2008).
172. Id. at ES-8; see also Assn. of Am. R.R.s, The Effects ( Rail Mergers on the Number of Class I
Railroads and Shipper Captivity 1, http://www.aar.org/Resources/-/media/AAR/BackgroundPapers/
NumberofClassIRRsAug2008.ashx (Aug. 2008) (claiming 22 "Class I railroads or rail systems" in 1980

under inflation-adjusted definition).
173. Laurits R. Christensen Assocs., Inc., supra n. 171, at ES-9.
174. Id. at ES 27.
175. Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 9-10.
176. Surface Transp. Bd., Study of Railroad Rates: 1985 2007 at 2, http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/
industry/econ rateindex.html; select "Rate Study: 1985 2007" (Jan. 16, 2009).
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stock nearly doubled the performance of the S&P 500 from 2002 to
2007.177 BNSF's earnings per share increased 19% in 2008.178 Its average
agricultural product revenues per car/unit increased by 23% on a ton-mile
increase of just 5.2% over 2008; and in the fourth quarter, as agricultural
product ton-miles dropped 10.9%, its average car/unit revenues actually increased 20% due to what the railroad termed "strong yields" in its pricing. 179 These results came during the American economy's worst quarterly
performance in a quarter century. 18 0
The railroads' revival, however, comes at the expense of the grain
shippers whose money supports those "strong yields." Unlike other commodity freight rates, grain rates increased by 9% between 1985 and
2004.18l Railroad consolidation has not passed on the efficiencies to captive grain farmers; for similar long-distance grain routes to Portland, Oregon, the rates from North Dakota, with one Class I railroad, are approxi18 2
mately double the amount from South Dakota with two Class I railroads.
While the overall ratio of rail shipper captivity to railroad monopolies has
declined between 1994 and 2004, shipper captivity in Montana and similarly situated states has increased by 25% or more. 18 3 Similarly, while the
number of "potentially captive" shipments with R/VC percentages over
180% has decreased since 1985, the number of high-markup shipments with
R/VC percentages over 300% has increased. 18 4 Over the past decade, the
share of grain shipments from the Billings area to the Portland area travelling at over 300% R/VC have increased from almost zero to about 50%.185
The Lerner Index, which measures a railroad's monopoly power as a
"markup" ratio above marginal cost, is higher for grain shipments than any
other commodity and is rising. This indicates that "grain shippers are not
1 86
unjustified in viewing themselves as paying relatively high markups.
A 2009 study confirms the impact of railroad captivity on Montana
grain shippers, the successors to the McCarty Farms class.18 7 Rail freight
177. BNSF, BNSF Corporate Citizenship Report 52, http://www.bnsf.com/investors/ccr/2007/pdf/
bnsf-2007_ccr.pdf (2007).
178. BNSF, BNSF Annual 2008 Investors' Report 1, http://www.bnsf.com/investors/investorreports/
4Q 2008 Investors Report.pdf (Jan. 21, 2009).
179. Id. at 11, 2.
180. Kelly Evans, Profits Drop at Steepest Rate in 55 Years, Wall St. J. (March 26, 2009) (available
at http://online.wsj.corn/article/SB 123807065934647327.html).
181. Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 13-14.
182. Id. at 21.
183. Id. at 27 28, 34 fig. 18.
184. Id. at 31-32; see also Laurits R. Christensen Assocs., Inc., supra n. 171, at ES-11 (ton-miles

over 300 percent R/VC increased from 5 percent to 9 percent from 2000-2001 and 2005-2006).
185. Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 35 fig. 19.
186. Laurits R. Christensen Assocs., Inc., supra n. 171, at 11-22, ES-23 tbl. ES-6.
187. See John Cutler et al., Railroad Rates and Services Provided to Montana Shippers: A report
preparedfor the State of Montana, http://www.doj.mt.gov/; search "Railroad Rates and Services Pro-
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rates for wheat shipments are higher per-car and per-ton in Montana than in
any other major grain-shipping state, despite comparable shipping distances
from Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.""' For 2006, the
study reported R/VC ratios for Montana wheat shipments to the Pacific
Northwest of 288% for shuttle trains of more than 100 cars-the predominant mode of grain transportation from Montana-compared to an average
of 240% for shuttle trains in the peer states; non-shuttle trains showed R/
VC ratios of 248% and 216% for Montana and the peer states, respectively.1 9 Based on these rates, Montana grain shippers would have paid
$19 million less annually to BNSF if they enjoyed their peer state R/VC
ratios, and approximately $50 million less if they paid at the R/VC jurisdictional level of 180%.190
Meanwhile, BNSF's emphasis on shuttle-train service led to a reduction of grain elevators in Montana from almost 200 in 1984 to less than 50
today, despite increased production.1 91 Seventy percent of Montana grain
producers are hauling grain farther to the grain elevator, while the average
haul for those producers has extended to more than 20 miles, both of which
shift costs from the railroads and grain elevators to the producers. 192 The
study concluded that its results "make a compelling case for rate relief," but
with the reduction in grain elevator ownership since McCarty Farms, the
direct shippers with the strongest case for relief are "reluctant to jeopardize"
193
their relationships with the sole market-dominant railroad, BNSF.
A.

Congress's Next Acts in Regulatory Reform

In the late 1970s, railroads wondered whether clear actions, in what
became the Staggers Act, would follow Congress's bold statement in the 4R
Act. Captive shippers do not face the existential threat that was posed to
some railroads three decades ago, but they do find themselves in a similar
situation. The Termination Act prodded the new Board to make rate challenges work for the vast majority of captive shippers for whom "assume a
railroad" was not an option. More than a decade later, captive shippers are
still waiting for clear actions that will make rate relief a reality. Two bills
under consideration by Congress propose such clear actions. While both
bills contain steps in the right direction, their successful implementation
vided to Montana Shippers" (Feb. 2009)) [hereinafter Montana Shippers]. The author served as an
editor of the report.
188. Id. at 7 fig. 3 (based on 2006 data).
189. Id. at 8-9.
190. Id. at 12.
191. Id. at 16.
192. Id. at 19 fig. 15.
193. Montana Shippers, supra n. 187, at 26.
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depends on understanding the institutional lessons of McCarty Farms.
Those lessons identify limits on the regulatory model that the Board, the
railroads, and captive shippers have inherited, and suggest how the model's
goals may be realized under reformed laws.
The first proposal reemphasizes the pro-competition and rate-regulation mission of the Board, clears away Commission and Board decisions
and policies that did not fulfill that mission in the past, and makes one more
attempt to simplify rate guidelines. The second proposal would give the
Board itself competition on the enforcement side by subjecting railroads to
the same antitrust review and liability imposed on other industries, regulated and unregulated alike. Together, they offer contrasting yet potentially
complimentary institutional approaches to the captive shipper problem, one
relying on the Board's expertise to enforce more detailed statutory prescriptions, and the other relying on the courts' independence to enforce the
broader competition norms of antitrust law.
1.

The Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act

The 111 th Congress likely will consider a broad reform of the Board's
powers and mission, similar to a bill introduced in the previous Congress:
The Railroad Competition and Service Improvement Act of 2007 (Competition Act). 194 If reintroduced and enacted, the Competition Act would reorient the STB toward "implementation directives" of "effective competition
among rail carriers" and "reasonable rates for rail customers in the absence
of competition," without the railroad support mechanisms that characterized
and even compromised the regulatory goals of the 4R and Staggers Acts.195
Several of the Act's provisions would clarify the legality of certain
railroad practices and overturned the Board's decisions to the contrary.
Railroads would have to quote "bottleneck rates" for service to any two
points on the railroad's line, including on "bottlenecks" where one railroad
controls a segment within a rail route that is otherwise competitive; a shipper could then pay (or challenge) uncompetitive rates only on the bottleneck
segment, and potentially benefit from competitive rates on the remainder of
the route. 196 "Paper barrier[s]," agreements by short-line or regional railroads not to interchange traffic that would compete with a dominant national railroad (from which they may have purchased or leased track),
194.
195.
196.
require

Sen. 953, 110th Cong. (Mar. 21, 2007).
Id. at § 101.
Id. at § 102; see also Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 48-49 & fig. 24 (Bottleneck rates "would
a railroad to establish a rate, and thereby offer to provide service, for any two points on the

railroad's system where traffic originates, terminates, or can be interchanged."); MidAmerican Energy
Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 1099, 1107 (8th Cif. 1999) (deferring to Board's determination that
a railroad's common carrier duties did not require it to quote separate bottleneck rates).
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would be presumptively illegal. 197 The Board could mandate "reciprocal
switching" to allow railroads access to nearby shippers and to set the terms
if the railroads could not agree. 198 A governor could petition the Board for
designation of a state as an "area of inadequate rail competition," applicable
to highly captive states like Montana. 199 That designation would provide
the Board near-plenary authority to remedy "inadequate rail competition"
20 0
within its jurisdiction.
The Competition Act also would provide captive shippers "a right of
access," which is not defined further, to rate-reasonableness determinations. 20 1 More specifically, the Act would require the adoption of "a
method for determining the reasonableness of rail rates based on the railroad's actual costs," which could not be "based on the costs of a hypothetical competitor. ' 20 2 It also would provide for final-offer arbitration, which
20 3
Canada has used to resolve disputes between railroads and shippers.
That provision reiterates the Act's opposition to Stand-Alone Cost methods,
barring the use of "any method based on stand-alone cost, the costs of a
hypothetical competitor, or ... precedent adopting or applying such methods."' 20 4 The Act would empower the Board to initiate investigations on its
own and to enjoin preliminarily railroad activities having effects beyond a
20 5
single complainant.
2.

The ProposedRailroad Antitrust Enforcement Act

Congress also has introduced a bill that would enable antitrust enforcement against railroad activities under the Board's jurisdiction that tradition197. Sen. 953, 110th Cong. at § 103; see also Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 50-51 & fig. 25;
Review of Rail Access & Competition ssues Renewed Pet. of the W. Coal Traffic League, 2007 WL
3170981 (Surface Transp. Bd. 2007) (reviewing paper barrier "interchange agreements ... including

credits for cars interchanged with the seller or lessor carrier, a penalty for traffic interchanged with
another railroad, or a total ban on interchange with any carrier other than the seller or lessor carrier,"
requiring certain disclosures of such agreements but declining to find such agreements unreasonable in
themselves). Notably, Montana Rail Link, the regional railroad that interchanges with BNSF within

Montana, has complained of its dependence on a dominant railroad, insisting "that the combination of
paper barriers and marketing agreements [that give a dominant railroad the exclusive right to market and

price interline traffic] very often puts the fate of small railroads and their shippers squarely in the hands
of the small railroad's Class I connection." Major Rail Consolidation Procedures,2000 WL 1535932
(Surface Transp. Bd. 2000).
198. Sen. 953, 110th Cong. at § 104; see also Freight Railroads, supra n. 1, at 44-45 (reciprocal

switching "would allow STB to require railroads serving shippers that are close to another railroad to
transport cars of a competing railroad for a tee . .
STB would oversee the pricing of switching
agreements.").
199. Sen. 953, 110th Cong. at § 105.
200. Id.
201. Id. at § 301.
202. Id. at § 302.
203. Id. at § 304; Montana Shippers, supra n. 187, at 25.

204. Sen. 953, 110th Cong. at § 304.
205. Id. at § 401.
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ally were immune from liability under statute or judicial doctrine: The Railroad Antitrust Enforcement Act of 2009 (Antitrust Act). 20 6 It would restore
the relationship between rail-rate regulation and antitrust liability as it existed in the early days of both laws, when the United States Supreme Court
held that the Sherman Act "covers, and was intended to cover, common
20 7
carriers by railroad," notwithstanding the Interstate Commerce Act.
The Act would extend antitrust review under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act to railroad mergers, rather than vesting exclusive merger-review power
in the Board. 20 Previously, the STB exercised its exclusive jurisdiction to
approve the 1996 merger of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads under a general "public interest" standard, a decision the law required
a reviewing court to give "considerable deference. ' 20 9 The Justice Department recommended that the Board deny the merger, arguing that it would
give Union Pacific a monopoly in hundreds of western markets and possi2 10
bly would result in $800 million in consumer price increases annually.
The Act also would overturn judicially-created immunity based on the
2 11
filed-rate doctrine as it applies to rates within the Board's jurisdiction.
Federal and state antitrust enforcement agencies, as well as private parties,
could pursue treble-damage antitrust claims against railroads "without regard to whether such railroads have filed rates or whether a complaint challenging a rate has been filed. '2 12 That provision, and another provision
opening the railroads to private actions for injunctive relief,2 13 may open to
challenge some of the practices that also would be prohibited by the Competition Act. "Primary jurisdiction," the doctrine that first brought the McCarty Farms case to the Commission for an original determination of rate
reasonableness, would not be required for antitrust claims. 2 14 The Act
would terminate several other antitrust exemptions for Board-approved
2 5
agreements among railroads. '
B.

ProceduralLessons from InstitutionalFailure

In its most recent Simplified Standards proceedings, the Board was at a
loss to explain the blank docket of small shipper complaints since its first
206. Sen. 146, 111th Cong. (Jan. 6, 2009).
207. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri FreightAssn., 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897).

208. Sen. 146, 111th Cong. at § 3.
209. See W. Coal Traffic League v.Surface Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 775, 778 (1999).

210. U.S. Dept. Just., Justice Department Urges Denial of Union Pacific/Southern Pacific Merger,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1996/0673.pdf (June 3, 1996).
211. See Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) ("The legal rights of shipper as against
carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside,
this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.").
212. Sen. 146, 111th Cong. at § 6.
213. Id. at § 2.
214. Id. at § 4.
215. Id. at § 7.
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reconfiguration of the simplified guidelines in 1996. Since McCarty Farms
and the Staggers Act both got their start in 1980, the Commission and the
Board have constantly reworked the rules and guidelines in cases and ex
parte proceedings, attracting a steady flood of commentary, challenges, and
petitions for review before the federal courts. The rate reasonableness
guidelines are only the front lines of a 30-year war between railroads and
shippers; they also keep fighting smaller but strategically important battles
over revenue adequacy, costs, and market dominance, all the while keeping
a close eye on potentially outflanking maneuvers in Congress.
The McCarty Farmsand Simplified Standards stories leave the impression that these proceedings form the battleground where reasonable rates
and revenue adequacy will be won or lost. Perhaps, advocates could think,
resolution is as close as a court decision sustaining the Three Benchmark
Method or the Competition Act's slaying of Stand-Alone Cost. Yet it is
worth stepping back to consider the institutions and incentives that constitute the order of battle and the rules of engagement in the railroad rate
fights. Not even the purest economic theory can properly allocate the costs
and benefits of captive rail shipping without a workable process to translate
theory into reality. The Commission and the Board have lacked that process for several institutional reasons that one can isolate from the broader
policy and economic debates in railroad regulation.
1. The Staggers Act Formalized Regulatory Ambivalence
At the time of the classic work on "regulatory capture" in 1971, it was
already observed that "[s]o many economists ...have denounced the ICC
for its pro-railroad policies that this has become a clich6 of the literature. ' 21 6 It is not, therefore, a novel finding that the Board's decisions continued to have the effect of favoring a few concentrated railroad interests
over many diffuse shipping interests.
What is novel about the post-Staggers Act regime is that the Commission and Board assumed a duty to protect railroad interests and that this
duty of ensuring revenue adequacy expressly constrains the original rateregulation duty of the Commission. Formally, the Board, and the Commission before it, has possessed an ambivalent mission to protect both railroads
and shippers. Notwithstanding the intervening ICC Termination Act, the
Board works within a regulatory model built to save the American railroad
21 7
industry. Mission accomplished.
216. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 2, no. 1
(Spring 1971) (reprinted in The Essence qf Stigler 258 (Kurt R. Leube & Thomas Gale Moore eds.,
Hoover 1986)).
217. See id. at Part IV.
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As the industry often points out, the Board's future decisions are not
free of risk for railroads. 2 18 Yet there are risks on the other side, too, and
history since the Staggers Act suggests that the financial risks to captive
shippers of the Board's inaction have been great, even if they have not been
visibly catastrophic. The costs of regulatory inefficacy to farms and other
small captive shippers are diffuse, indirect, and difficult to ascribe to the
Board, while a railroad's failure would appear to be a clear failure of the
Board. These regulatory optics have distorted the Board's construction of
its statutory mandate beyond the effects of regulatory capture by railroad
interests. 219 So the Board tends to err on the side of revenue adequacy for
railroads, even at great costs to captive shippers, because a major railroad
bankruptcy would prove a far more salient failure of the Board than the
millions of potentially unrecognized overcharges.
The Board's aversion to the risk of railroad failure, and the aversion of
the Commission before it, may reflect the traumatic birth of its regulatory
model in the railroad crisis of the 1970s. Thirty years later, however, that
historic aversion persists despite the railroads' success under the Staggers
Act and, in the absence of an offsetting aversion towards unreasonable
rates, imposes a cost on captive shippers. Revenue adequacy is a command,
but it is no more a command than rate reasonableness. Given that the two
commands conflict, risks will always present themselves in any course of
action. The Competition Act's new shipper-oriented "implementation directives" would give the Board a reason to reassess implicitly the balance of
risks but would fail to tip the scales decisively in favor of the shipping
public. As an early observer of the Interstate Commerce Commission's
capture by the railroads explained, "[w]hen such a commission loses its
objectivity and impartiality by becoming dependent upon the support of a
single narrow interest group .... it becomes necessary to subordinate this

agency to some other agency possessing a broader outlook and a broader
basis of political support.12 20 The simpler pro-consumer orientation of federal, state, and private antitrust enforcers bringing claims to independent
22 1
generalist judges may prove a surer escape from regulatory captivity.
218. Woodman & Starke, The Competitive Access Debate:A 'Backdoor' Approach to Rate Regula-

tion, 16 Transp. L.J. 263, 281 (1988) (arguing that structural "competitive access" remedies would result
"inrate increases, lost traffic, decline in revenues, lost jobs, and deterioration in service the same
litany of woes, it should be noted, that characterized the rail industry in the days of significant Government regulation").
219. See B. Bump, Held Captive: How IncreasedRegulation Arrests Railroads' Ability to Serve the
Nation, 5 DePaul Bus. L.J. 731, 752-756 (2007) (arguing that the Board can best serve the public

interest
by favoring the "long-term" protection of railroads over the "short-term" protection of shippers).
220. Huntington, supra n. 9, at 508.
221. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and Regulatory Gaming, 87 Tex.
L. Rev. 685, 729 ("Regulators cannot, should not, and do not substitute for antitrust courts in ensuring
vibrant competitive markets"); Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, Olin
Working Paper No. 312 at 1-2, http://ssrn.com/abstract=937020 (last accessed Mar. 7, 2009) (explain-
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The Board Applied Rules for Standards, and Standardsfor Rules

The Commission's and Board's institutional tendency toward regulatory capture is exacerbated not only by an ambivalent mission to protect
railroads alongside shippers, but also by the complexity of the regulatory
structure put in place to execute that mission. Regulatory simplicity can
limit this tendency by promoting a more focused and transparent agency
mission; "[d]iscretionary regulation is hard enough; baroque elaboration of
regulatory principles may confound an already intractable task. '222 Strong,
clear regulations "minimize the opportunity for mischief' where otherwise
.,overloaded regulators [may] reflexively protect the firms and legal structures they know best. 2 2 3 As the D.C. Circuit recently recognized, there is
"'an institutional interest in reducing the cost for parties litigating rate
cases," and the Board has broad discretion to serve that interest by stream224
lining its procedures and increasing the predictability of its jurisdiction.
Further efforts toward an accessible rate relief process are limited, however,
by an economically arbitrary jurisdictional rule and a procedurally complex
standard for rate relief.
The only fixed point in the constantly shifting regulatory landscape
under the Staggers Act has been the 180% R/VC ratio that serves as the
statutory threshold for what the Board has designated "potentially captive"
shipping rates. But this number conveys a false precision. The complex
methods of accounting for railroad rates and revenues are subject to dispute
and manipulation.2 2 5 Beyond this, drawing a bright line at the 180% level
lacks an economic justification. 226 A Congressional compromise on the
number in the Staggers Act made a rule where there should be a standard.
Changes in railroad costs, revenues, and markets year to year, and over
thirty years, call for a more flexible standard of captivity and rate-relief
ing how the threat of antitrust enforcement can act as a check on the capture of regulators); Diane P.
Wood, GeneralistJudges in a Specialized World, 50 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1755, 1767 (1997) ("the generalist

judge is less likely to become the victim of regulatory capture than her specialized counterpart, despite
the best of intentions on the latter's side"); John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theon of Antitrust
Federalism, 99 Harv. L. R. 713 (1986) (proposing antitrust scrutiny of state regulations that result from

industry capture).
222. Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure,the Market, and the Law, 98 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1617, 1657 (2004).
223. Id. at 1658.
224. BNSF Ry., 526 F.3d at 776.
225. See e.g. Rail Fuel Surcharges, 2007 WL 201205 at *8 (Surface Transp. Bd. 2007) (requiring
reporting of fuel surcharges to increase rate transparency); Major Issues in Rate Cases, 2006 WL

3087168 at 12 (Surface Transp. Bd. 2006) (expressing concern that rate relief rule "permits the railroads to unfairly manipulate the outcome" of rate cases).

226. One post-Staggers Act study of western coal shipping found that railroads exercised limited
monopoly power (capturing about 25% of monopoly rents) at a mean R/VC ratio equivalent of 133%,
but concluded that further study into the determinants of shipper captivity was required. P. V. Garrod &
W. Miklius, 'Captive Shippers' and the Success of Railroads in Capturing Monopoly Rent, 30 J.L. &
Econs. 423, 439-440 (1987).
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based on the economics of the industry as it exists today. For years, the
Board has carefully calibrated its fee schedule yearly to its own labor costs,
as required by statute, 227 but Congress has not recalibrated the most critical
metric in the Board's jurisdiction since before the end of the Milwaukee
Road. In practice, the 180% threshold also suffers from the same risk aversion imbalance exhibited in the revenue adequacy assessments; the Board's
rate guidelines suggest a greater concern with falling below the "jurisdictional" threshold for its captivity mandate than with the mandated provision
of reasonable rate relief for every eligible captive shipper.
Conversely, where the Board could use a rule to help captive shippers
assess their rate claims, it has imposed a standard. In McCarty Farms, the
Commission temporarily solved a significant small shipper relief problem
by applying an R/VC ratio comparison rule and running the numbers. Unfortunately, the comparison rule was insufficiently theorized, and the $16
million awarded was deceptively large, so the reviewing court held the
Commission had "not intelligibly explained" its trade-off "between the
quality and cost of possible regulatory approaches. '228 The days of rulebased relief ended and small shippers lost the guarantee of a certain measure of damages if rates were found to be unreasonably high. The Board
replaced the idea of a clear rule for small shippers with a balancing test of
three rules that amounted to a standard. As the Board learned while the
standard gathered dust for ten years, lowering the costs of litigation does
not invite more cases if a shipper cannot calculate the value of the relief
afforded through litigation. Here, the Competition Act presents an opportunity for the Board to consider more predictable rate-relief formulas for
small-shipper cases. A clearer policy directive from Congress could allow
the Board to revisit the successful case-by-case benchmarking method applied by the Commission to grant the short-lived shipper relief in McCarty
Farms.229
3.

Incentives Matter for Shippers and Railroads

The Competition Act would provide a "right to access" for shippers,
but that means little without an improved understanding of the incentives
shippers and railroads face in rate cases. The Board estimated that its least
costly option for rate litigation, the Three Benchmark method, costs
$250,000 based on a small-claims court model. It would take a very large
"small claim" for a shipper to bring such a case. For example, McCarty
Farms was one of the larger producers in its case, and it shipped 3,000 tons
of grain annually. Assume that McCarty Farms paid current per-ton rates
for shipping-approximately $33 according to the Montana Shippers re227. 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (2007); 49 C.F.R. § 1002.3 (2008).
228. Burlington N. R.R. v. LC.C., 985 F.2d 589, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

229. For a discussion on alternate methods of reviewing rates, see supra Part 1.B.2.
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port 230 -which amount to $100,000 in shipping costs per year. Assume the
high end of the overcharge calculated in the Montana Shippers report: approximately 20%.231 With a $20,000 overcharge each year for five years,
McCarty Farms could collect at most $100,000 from the Three Benchmark
method. Even when recovery is assured at the high end of what an individual producer might claim, small shippers will not bring a case for $250,000
in litigation costs.
A reasonable level of risk also would deter medium and large shippers
from bringing cases. 232 A shipper with a fifty-fifty chance of success in
pursuing a $2 million claim that costs $1 million to litigate under the Simplified-SAC approach would have no expected return, 233 and the same analysis would apply to a large shipper with a fifty-fifty chance of success in
pursuing a $10 million claim under the full-SAC approach with $5 million
in litigation costs.
Now consider the railroad's incentives. In Montana, BNSF earns $200
million in grain shipping revenues annually. 234 Its 20% overcharge is $40
million, assuming all shipments in Montana are captive. If BNSF calculated a 50% chance of a successful challenge, its expected return on the
illegal overcharge would be a loss of $5 million, and just a 60% chance of
235
defeating a rate challenge results in a positive return for the railroad.
This scenario may too optimistically assume a single challenge on behalf of
all shippers in the state, with each shipper sharing a relatively small share of
the litigation cost. Even if that were possible, who brings that case? After
McCarty Farms, grain elevators consolidated: they have much to lose from
challenging the one railroad on which their business depends, and comparatively little to fear from grain producers onto whom they can pass the railroad overcharge. After consolidation, grain elevators have increased their
market power over the producers, who may rather pay a freight overcharge
than drive another fifty miles to a competing elevator and back. Without
any realistic prospect of multiple, large, successful rate challenges, the railroad will not be deterred from exploiting captive shippers. In other words,
the Board's protection of small captive shippers under the current rules is
destined to fail.
230. Montana Shippers, supra n. 187, at 7.
231. Id. at 31.
232. This method follows the discussion and sources in Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, &
Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law 246, 246-247 (Harvard Univ. Press 1994).

233. Half of a $1 million gain after litigation costs plus half of a $1 million loss of litigation costs
nets to zero.

234. Montana Shippers, supra n. 187, at 7.

235. Half of a $35 million gain after litigation costs ($17.5 million) plus half of a $45 million loss
after litigation costs ($22.5 million) equals negative $5 million; 60% of a $35 million ($21 million) gain

plus 40% of a $45 loss ($18 million) equals positive $3 million. In this scenario, the "break-even"
probability of a successful challenge necessary to deter a rational railroad is 43.75%.
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Both Congressional proposals discussed above offer solutions to the
incentives problem. The Competition Act would allow the Board to initiate
its own investigation under a provision for plenary relief proceedings in
"areas of inadequate rate competition," like Montana. The Antitrust Act
opens enforcement to federal and state antitrust enforcers, including state
attorneys general on behalf of shippers as parens patriae, and private parties. Antitrust actions would have the benefit of federal and state class action rules to aggregate claims that are unprofitable to bring individually.
The Board should consider similar reforms, both to grant parens patriae
standing to state attorneys general and to allow some form of class action.
4.

Structural Remedies Should Complement Conduct Remedies

The ICC's regulation of "all charges" was, in antitrust terms, a kind of
conduct remedy as opposed to a structural remedy.2 36 Railroads had to do
business under the constant control of federal regulators, at great cost to the
railroads and, eventually, to the shipping public. The Staggers Act scaled
back the ongoing conduct remedy to a limited class of captive shippers.
The McCarty Farms story shows, however, that policing rate conduct for
the benefit of a small class of consumers under the captive shipper criterion
can prove as challenging for regulators as rate-setting for the entire industry
under the original Interstate Commerce Act. This is especially true when
the networked nature of the industry requires differential pricing, and the
class of consumers entitled to "reasonable rates" is not always obvious or
effective at asserting its entitlement. The ongoing need for regulating conduct in a dynamic industry also drives an endless cycle of litigating the
2 37
standards for regulation.
Structural remedies, such as blocking mergers or requiring asset divestitures, usually require a one-time intensive intervention, after which the
market is left to function subject to the structure imposed by the intervention. Despite the continued challenges of administering a conduct remedy,
however, the Commission and the Board have refused to impose structural
remedies when likely anticompetitive mergers present themselves. The
Board also has rejected more modest, if more administratively complex,
remedies like "bottleneck rates." The Competition Act would mandate
236. See generally Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (2001) (explaining difference between behavioral and structural remedies,

and proposing an efficiency-based criterion for choosing between the two in network industries).
237. See e.g. Anne Binghaman, U.S Dept. Just. Antitrust Div., Statement on the Surface Transportation Board's approval of the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Merger, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/

public/press-releases/1996/228323.htm (last accessed Apr. 2, 2009) ("As a condition of approval, the
Surface Transportation Board has given itself a significant regulatory oversight role for years to come in
an effort to prevent this merger from being anticompetitive. We continue to believe that a competitive

market structure-and not more regulation-is the best way to keep prices low in the railroad industry,
as in every industry.").
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some of these "open access" remedies similar to the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.238 The Antitrust Act could subject the railroads to similar
structural remedies by repealing the applicable exemptions. It also would
open the door to merger challenges by antitrust enforcers, although one antitrust enforcer has suggested that access remedies "may be necessary to
unravel the competitive problems that have developed as a result of the
'239
STB's and ICC's policy of granting virtually every merger application.
The merits of any particular structural remedy are debatable, 240 but in general structural remedies can mitigate the regulatory capture and procedural
uncertainty that is endemic to case-by-case rate proceedings before the
Board. As cumbersome as certain forms of "open access" mandates may
prove, they could hardly fare worse than the McCarty Farms experiment in
rate relief.
V.

CONCLUSION

The story of McCarty Farms suggests a great tragedy in rural law: the
original savior of the grain shipper, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
eventually rescued the railroads on the backs of farmers. The Commission
tried to avoid railroad failure at all costs and compromised its original regulatory mission to protect captive shippers. Yet the lessons from McCarty
Farms are both narrower and broader than this. Narrowly, the project of
captive shipper rate regulation did not fail simply to allow the railroads to
succeed; after the deregulation and consolidation of the railroads, their revenues exceeded by orders of magnitude the recoveries denied to the small
minority of shippers who were as captive to monopoly pricing as the McCarty Farms class members. There is little evidence that the Commission's
sacrifice of specific rate relief to overall revenue adequacy was necessary to
sustain the railroad industry; the Commission itself never considered the
question in McCarty Farms. More broadly, attempts at captive shipper rate
regulation since 1980 failed because of a general tendency toward capture
and complexity inherent in any model of centralized regulation. That
model was compromised further by the Staggers Act's bailout of a troubled
industry by distorting its regulatory agency's mission, rather than requiring
or allowing the industry to restructure in response to effective regulatory
and market pressures from consumers and competitors. As Congress again
considers reforming the legal institutions that regulate the railroad industry-while it also responds to a new wave of troubled industries-the
bailouts of yesterday may hold lessons for the bailouts of today.

238. Massa, supra n. 121, at 34-35.
239. Id. at 40.
240. Compare id. with Woodman & Starke, supra n. 218.
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